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ABSTRACT 
 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), a German philosopher, is considered as the father of modern ethics and 
one of the great philosophers in the history of philosophy. He wanted to establish firm foundation for 
moral philosophy. He contributed something new to modern ethics which was not attempted by earlier 
ethicists. He wanted to show by using reason that morality is based on a single supreme universal 
principle, which is binding to all rational beings. Precisely, Kant wanted to establish the first principle 
of morality which neglects all consideration of self-interest and even particular human problems. In 
the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claimed that his intention is to seek out and 
establish the supreme principle of morality, and that supreme principle is the categorical imperative. 
He puts the supreme principle of morality or the categorical imperative in at least five ways. These are 
formula of universal law (FUL), formula of universal law (FLN), formula of humanity (FH), formula 
of humanity (FA), and formula of realm of ends (FRE). However, Kant affirms that there is one 
canonical and general formulation of the categorical imperative and it is the FUL. For him, the other 
formulas are not distinct ethical principles; rather they are the reformulations or variant formulations 
of the single categorical imperative. Kant put this position in his works, The Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals. So, in this paper, I will mainly concentrate on the fundamental doctrine of the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. As I have tried to make clear before, Kant’s aim in the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals is to search for and establish the supreme principle of 
morality (i.e., categorical imperative). He attempted to do this at the end of the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals. But, to me, the way he attempted to justify the categorical imperative is 
problematic. Thus, in this paper, I argue that Kant did not put the categorical imperative or morality 
on a solid ground.   
 
Keywords: Categorical Imperative; formula of universal law (FUL);Groundwork of Metaphysics of 
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INTRODUCTION 
According to Paton, 
[1] 
Immanuel 
Kant, a German philosopher, is considered 
as the father of modern ethics. He wanted to 
lay unshakable foundation for moral 
philosophy. His contribution to ethics is 
totally new. He wanted to show, by using 
reason, that ethics and morality is based on 
a single supreme universal principle, which 
is binding to all rational beings. In precise 
words, Kant wanted to establish the first 
principle of morality which neglects all 
consideration of self-interest and even 
particular human problems. 
We can find Kant’s most influential 
position in his works, The Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics of Morals (we call it 
Groundwork hereafter) and developed his 
views in his later works. In this paper, I will 
mainly focus on the foundational doctrine of 
the Groundwork. I will also consider some 
of his other books in case situations impel 
me. 
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In the Preface of the Groundwork, Kant’s 
intention is to seek out and establish the 
supreme principle of morality, and that 
supreme principle is the categorical 
imperative. This is, Kant argues, one and 
only one supreme principle for all fields of 
morals. 
[2]
 
However, as Ellington reminds us, 
Kant does not insist that he discovered 
categorical imperative. Because Kant thinks 
that this supreme principle is a working 
criterion used by any rational agent to make 
their choice and judgment although they do 
not explicitly formulate it. 
[3] 
In other words, 
as discussed by Allison, 
[4] 
Kant aimed at 
exposing the moral principle which is 
implicitly used by the pre-philosophical 
understanding of morality. He insists that 
although in pre-philosophical understanding 
of morality any ordinary good man used this 
moral principle to judge moral actions, he 
was unable to make it clear for themselves. 
Thus, in section one of the Groundwork, 
Kant starts from the analysis of our ordinary 
moral views to determine the supreme 
principle behind it. As a result, he argues 
that the only thing good without 
qualification is a good will. The good will is 
good through its willing; that is, only a good 
will and actions that express this will have 
unrestricted or unconditional value.  
According to Korsgaard, to ascribe 
unconditional value to an action, for Kant, 
we have to know the motivation on the basis 
of which a person acts. Thus, what makes us 
attribute unconditional value to a morally 
good action is the motivation behind it. This 
suggests that if we know how actions with 
unconditional value are willed, we can 
know what makes them morally good. If we 
know what makes actions morally good, we 
can determine which one is morally good 
and what the moral law tells us to do. To 
determine what the moral law tells us to do, 
Kant attempts to find out the principle on 
which a person of a good will acts. 
[5]
 
For Kant, a person of a good will 
performs from the motive of duty. 
Consequently, if we analyze the concept of 
duty we can show what the principle of a 
good will is. For Kant, the defining feature 
of an action performed from duty is that the 
agent performs the action because he 
considers that it is the right thing to do. This 
defining feature of actions done from duty 
lies in the maxim upon which it is done. 
Kant holds that an agent who acts from duty 
or from good will considers his maxim as 
having the form of a law. The principle of a 
good will is, thus, to perform only actions 
whose maxim can be conceived as having 
the form of a law. 
[2]
 
In section two of the Groundwork, 
Kantarrives at the same conclusion but 
through different way. He chooses a 
philosophical starting point that leads him to 
a more complete and precise formulation of 
the moral principle. He analyses the concept 
of unconditional necessary action to 
uncover a principle similar to section one. 
Unconditionally necessary actions are moral 
actions. If an action is unconditionally 
necessary, the agent considers that doing the 
action is something required of him 
regardless of other things. Thus, the maxim 
upon which it is done should be conceived 
as a law. But, since the action is 
unconditional, the will cannot be bound to a 
particular law. As a result, it is the idea of 
law that is universal that binds the will. This 
takes us to Kant's first formulation of 
categorical imperative, formula of universal 
law (FUL). 
[4] 
Korsgaardin her book entitled 
Creating the Kingdom of Endsremind us, 
for Kant, to determine whether one wills his 
maxim to be a universal law, he can 
consistently will it as a law of nature. 
[6]
 
According to Paton, analysis of the 
concept of moral obligation shows that the 
FUL is its principle. But, it is impossible to 
show how it is binding on the will through 
mere analysis of the concept of moral 
obligation. Kant postpones this job to 
section three of the Groundwork. In 
preparation to resolve this problem, Kant 
has to show the kind of motivation that an 
agent who acts from categorical imperative 
has. He insists that since every action has an 
end, morality become possible if there exists 
an objectively necessary end. Kant 
Abraham Tsehay Jemberie. A Critical Analysis of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 
                    International Journal of Research & Review (www.gkpublication.in)  56 
Vol.4; Issue: 3; March 2017 
introduces humanity as the only end which 
is an end in itself. This enables him to 
formulate another version of the categorical 
imperative, namely the formula of humanity 
(FH). 
[7]
 
As discussed by Timmermann, Kant 
comes up with another formula of the 
categorical imperative by combining the 
previous two formulas (FUL and FH).  He 
takes the idea of legislation from FUL and 
the idea of self-determination from the FH 
to establish autonomous legislation in the 
realm of ends. For Kant, one might be 
motivated to obey the law either 
heteronomously or autonomously. Since a 
person who acts heteronomously is 
motivated to respect the law by some 
interest, the imperative from which his 
maxim is drawn is hypothetical. However, 
the moral imperative is categorical. A 
person who is motivated by it, acts 
autonomously. This implies that the laws of 
morality must be laws that a person imposes 
on himself. Kant suggests that any 
autonomous action must be governed by 
moral laws. The moral law just tells a 
person not to act on a principle that he does 
not will to be a law. It restricts a person to 
act in accordance with his autonomy. As a 
result, Kant suggests that the categorical 
imperative is the law of autonomy. 
[8]
 
According to Patonin section one 
and two of the Groundwork, Kant only tells 
us, through analysis, what morality is if it 
really exists. He does not tell us that 
morality really exists. Kant shows us this in 
section three of the Groundwork. To do so, 
he uses a synthetic argument. Kant insists 
that, as rational beings, we must consider 
ourselves as possessing a free will. We 
cannot consider our actions as causally 
determined by outside forces. This is a 
negative conception of freedom. Thus, it is 
uninformative. However, this negative 
concept of freedom is important to know the 
positive one. Kant leads to the positive 
concept of freedom in such a way that a 
lawless free will is self-contradictory. Thus, 
a free will would act under laws, but these 
laws could not be one imposed upon it other 
than itself.  Because if so, they would be 
just laws of natural necessity. If the laws 
under which free will act are not other 
imposed, they must be self-imposed. But, 
this is what does mean by autonomy. Since, 
for Kant, autonomy is the principle of 
morality, a free will is under moral laws. 
Therefore, morality follows from the 
concept of free will. 
[7]
 
Since morality is valid for all 
rational beings, it is impossible to base our 
notion of morality on the concept of free 
will if it is impossible to prove that all 
rational beings have free will. It is 
impossible to prove this issue from 
experience. However, it is possible to 
assume that a being is really free if it thinks 
of itself as free when it acts. This is because 
a being with reason and a will must think of 
itself as free. 
[2]
 
However, Kantcannot be satisfied by 
this argument because it is circular. He 
attempts to avoid this problem by 
establishing an independent ground to 
consider the will as free. The distinction 
between the noumenal and phenomenal 
world enables him to establish this 
independent ground. He insists that the will 
is part of both the noumenal and the 
phenomenal world. He says it is only in the 
phenomenal world that human being is 
causally determined.  But, as parts of the 
noumenal world, the will is free. 
[2]
 
As I have tried to make clear before, 
Kant’s aim in the Groundwork is to search 
for and establish the supreme principle of 
morality. He attempted to do this in section 
three of the Groundwork in which he 
affirmed that the noumenal world makes 
freedom possible since the idea of freedom 
makes any moral agent to be responsible for 
his act; moral obligation is real. But, to me, 
the way he attempted to justify a categorical 
imperative is problematic. Thus, in this 
paper, I argue that Kant does not put the 
categorical imperative or morality on a solid 
ground.   
This paper is composed of three 
parts each of which deals with a specific 
part of the paper. In the first part, I will 
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briefly discuss and analyze how Kant, in the 
Groundwork, arrives at the first formulation 
of the supreme principle of morality by 
analyzing ordinary moral beliefs. In the 
second part, I will analyze how Kant 
reaches the various formulation of the 
categorical imperative by taking more 
philosophical stand point. In the third, I will 
analyze how Kant attempted to establish the 
notion of categorical imperative in the 
Groundwork and I will also show how his 
attempt is unsuccessful. Finally, in 
conclusion part, I will briefly show how the 
reason he used to establish the validity of 
the categorical imperative, in the 
Groundwork, is insufficient.        
THE GOOD WILL AND THE 
SUPREME PRINCIPLE OF 
MORALITY 
THE GOOD WILL  
In section one of the Groundwork, 
Kant’s project is “to proceed analytically 
from common moral cognition to the 
determination of its supreme principle.” [2] 
Korsgaard tells us that Kant starts from our 
ordinary ways of thinking about morality 
and moves into discovering the principle 
behind it. Although Kant, in this section, is 
analyzing ordinary moral view, he is not 
justifying that human beings have moral 
obligation. He is rather merely identifying 
what is essential to prove that moral 
obligation is real. 
[5]
 
“The common cognition from which 
Kant starts his argument is that morally 
good actions have a special kind of value. A 
person who does the right thing for the right 
reason evinces what Kant calls a good will.” 
[2] 
Thus, Kant's analysis of ordinary views of 
morality begins with the thought that “It is 
not possible to think of anything in the 
world, or indeed out of it, that can be held to 
be good without limitation except a good 
will.” [2] 
Here, the objective is to identify the 
principle that ordinary good man is 
supposed to use in judging his action 
although he does not explicitly formulate it. 
Kant’s intention is to derive it by analyzing 
of the concept of a good will. Thus, to 
explicitly state this principle, we have to 
know more about “a good will” and “good 
without qualification”. [1] 
By “good without limitation”, Kant 
means that it is only a good will which is 
good in any context. That is, its goodness 
does not change along with the change of 
contexts, desires and ends. Thus, Kant 
concludes that good will is an absolute and 
unconditioned good. It is also the only thing 
which is good in itself and independently of 
other things 
[4]
 
Kant does not mean that a good will 
is the only good. Ruther, he divides all 
goods into two: “gifts of nature” and “gifts 
of fortune”. Although Kant does not deny 
that all “gifts of nature” and “gifts of 
fortune” are good in many respects, he does 
not confirm that they are good without 
limitation. He claims that, on the contrary, 
they can be extremely bad or evil when they 
are used with a bad will. This implies that 
they are good within certain conditions. 
Thus, they are conditioned good and are not 
absolutely good. 
[7]
 
Moreover, Kant believes that the 
goodness of the good will is not derived 
from the good result it produces. But, it just 
attaches a distinct, conditioned and qualified 
good that does not have any influence on its 
inner nature. Sometimes, a good will might 
be combined with defects of the mind or bad 
qualities of temperament. In this case, it 
may fail to achieve good results. But, a good 
will continues to have its inner absolute 
value although it fails to achieve the result it 
aims to achieve. 
[9]
 
A GOOD WILL AND DUTY 
Kant discusses the concept of duty to 
further clarify the concept of a good will. 
His main claim is that the concept of duty 
“contains that of the concept of a good will 
though under subjective limitation and 
hindrances, which far from concealing it 
and make it unrecognizable, bring out by 
contrast and make it shine forth all the more 
brightly”. [2] This passage, as Paton tells us, 
is incorrectly interpreted by many readers of 
the Groundwork, but Kant’s intention in this 
passage is that a will which acts for the sake 
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of duty is a good will. However, Paton 
suggests, it should not follow from this that 
a good will is necessarily one that acts for 
the sake of duty. To understand this, we 
have to make clear the concept of duty. The 
very idea of duty involves the overcoming 
of desires and inclinations. On the other 
hand, a completely good will or “holy” will 
can manifest itself without overcoming 
natural inclinations. So, a good will as such 
would not act for the sake of duty since it 
includes a holy will that manifests itself 
without being constrained by duty. 
However, man’s will is not holy since in 
finite creatures such as man, there are 
certain “subjective limitations” or obstacles. 
Thus, a will that acts for the sake of duty is 
a good will under human conditions. This 
also implies that the concept of a good will 
as such is broader than the concept of a will 
that acts for the sake of duty. Thus, a will 
which acts for the sake of duty is a special 
form of a good will that overcomes 
subjective limitations and hindrances. It 
manifests itself in duty under adverse 
situations. 
[1] 
According to Wood, Kant 
takes us to this special form of a good will, 
because the good will’s unlimited worth is 
shown more brightly to common rational 
cognition in this conditions and it is under 
this condition that a good will is different 
from other conditional goods, and then its 
higher value becomes clear. 
[9]
 
According to Paton, Kant elucidates 
the concept of duty by three propositions of 
which he explicitly states only the second 
and the third propositions. But, his 
suggestion that the third proposition is the 
consequence of the last two propositions 
impels commentators to search for the first 
proposition. The most appropriate candidate 
of the first proposition, although he does not 
explicitly state it, seems like: an action has 
moral worth or value only when it is done 
from duty 
[7] 
and then Kant compares it with 
actions that conform to duty. An action is 
said to conform to duty if it complies with 
what duty requires regardless of the 
motivation for doing it. Kant ascribes true 
“moral worth” or “moral content” only to 
actions done from duty. 
[2] The term “moral 
worth”,  “do not refer to just any sort of 
value morality might attach to actions, but 
designate only that special degree of worth 
that most conspicuously elicits esteem from 
common rational cognition”. [9] However, if 
an action lacks moral worth in this sense, it 
does not follow that it is worthless from 
moral point of view. In fact, all actions that 
conform to duty have value from moral 
point of view, but they do not just have a 
special degree of value that goes beyond 
such mere moral approval and elicits esteem 
from common rational cognition. 
[9]
 
Kant’s second proposition about 
duty is that: “an action from duty has its 
moral worth not in the purpose to be 
attained by it but in the maxim in 
accordance with which it is decided upon, 
and therefore does not depend upon the 
realization of the object of the action but 
merely upon the principle of volition in 
accordance with which the action is done 
without regard for any object of the faculty 
of desire.” [2] In the first proposition, we 
have seen that an action has moral value 
only if it is done from duty. The above 
proposition adds that the moral value of 
such an action does not stem from the result 
that the action produces or seeks to produce. 
[2] 
If the moral worth of the action cannot be 
derived from any inclination of achieving 
something, then it cannot be derived from 
the result it is sought or produced. 
[1]
 
The idea so far has been negative; 
the source of moral worth is not the result 
that the action in fact produces or aims to 
produce. So, it is uninformative. It is 
necessary to make this doctrine more 
positive. If an action from duty does not 
derive its distinct value from the result it 
achieves or seeks to achieve, it must more 
specifically be from the motive of duty. 
[1] 
Kant expresses it in such a way that an 
action done from duty gains its moral worth 
from a maxim, and the maxim is not a 
maxim of producing results. 
[2]
 
Patonremind us that, for Kant, a 
maxim is a particular principle (in a loose 
sense) that one follows to perform a certain 
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action. It is considered as a purely personal 
principle to the agent. It is subjective, 
because it is a principle that a rational agent 
follows to accomplish a certain action. 
Subjective principles are valid only for an 
agent who chooses to act upon it. 
[1]
 
Thus, Kant’s technical term for this 
subjective principle is a “maxim”. It is 
different from an objective principle since it 
is not valid for all rational agents. It is also 
not the same as a motive, because it is more 
general than a motive, and that is why it is 
called a principle. So, maxim includes both 
the action and its motive. It is not, however, 
considered as valid for everyone else, like 
objective principle, and it can be good or 
bad. 
[1]
 
 Kantidentifies two kinds of maxims: 
material maxim and formal maxim. Any 
moral action does not have its moral worth 
from a material maxim. It rather has its 
moral worth from a formal maxim or 
principle of performing ones duty whatever 
that duty might be. 
[2]
 
The third proposition of Kant about 
duty is that “duty is the necessity to act out 
of reverence for the law”. [2] Paton discussed 
that, for Kant, the maxim of a morally good 
action is formal maxim. If so, it must be a 
maxim of acting on a law which is valid for 
all rational beings irrespective of their 
particular interests. It is true that human 
beings are fallible. As a result, this law must 
be presented in the form of duty that orders 
us to be obedient. Since this law is 
considered as an imposed one on us, it must 
arouse a feeling which is akin to fear. On 
the other hand, having realized that this law 
is imposed on us by our own self, it must 
arise a feeling akin to inclination. By 
inclination, it is to mean a delight that 
results from the awareness of the imposition 
comes from our own free and rational will. 
It is this kind of feeling that Kant calls 
reverence. This feeling does not arise from 
any kind of sense stimulation. It is rather 
from being conscious that the will is 
subordinated to a universal law which is 
free from sensuous impact. From this, one 
can understand that as long as a morally 
good action is motivated out of this kind of 
unique feeling, it is convincing to say that a 
morally good action is performed out of 
reverence for the law. 
[7]
 
Having discussed a good will under 
human condition as one which acts for the 
sake of duty, and duty as “the necessity of 
actions from respect for the law”, the next 
possible question would be the nature of this 
law by which a good will has its unique and 
absolute value. Thus, according to 
Timmermann, 
[8] Kant’s analysis is yet to be 
completed since we do not still know the 
law that inspires reverence and motivates 
morally good actions. 
According to Timmermann, in 
describing the nature of the law by which a 
person of a good will performs his action, 
Kant presents us with the first version of the 
supreme principle of morality which is 
officially, for the first time, called 
categorical imperative in section two of the 
Groundwork in the following way: to realize 
a specific end, we have to follow a certain 
command that enables us to use specific 
laws. However, morally good actions are 
not actions done for the sake of some end 
that one wants to fulfill. If so, all laws used 
to realize a particular end cannot be 
candidates of moral law. That is, these laws 
cannot inspire reverence and motivate 
morally good actions. Thus, if these specific 
laws are discarded, the only possible 
candidates of the moral law must be law 
abidingness or “the universal conformity to 
law as such”. [8] Kant argues that if there is 
something by the name moral obligation, 
then we have to recognize that our wills are 
directed by this principle: “I ought never to 
act except in such a way that I could also 
will that my maxim should become a 
universal law”. [2] “The necessity of an 
action from reverence for this law is duty, 
the condition of a human will that is 
essentially good beyond everything else. 
Thus, the concept of the good will is 
connected with that of the law through the 
concept of duty.” [2] 
Kant claims that his analysis fully 
agrees with ordinary human reason. That is, 
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although the ordinary good man does not 
establish the above principle in abstraction, 
he really uses it in evaluating particular 
moral matters. 
[2]
 
THE BACKGROUND OF 
CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 
RATIONAL AGENCY AND 
IMPERATIVES 
According to Allisonin section two 
of the Groundwork, Kant continues to the 
exposition of the supreme principle of 
morality to show that this principle has the 
characteristics of absolute necessity. 
Because it is impossible to show this by 
claiming that it is implicitly found in 
common human reason. He accomplishes 
this by analyzing the concept of rational 
agent as such particularly finite rational 
beings. 
[4]
 
Allison also tells us that Kant makes, 
however, the situation more complicated by 
deriving additional formulas to what he 
names a single categorical imperative to 
fully construct the concept of categorical 
imperative. 
[4]
 
Kant begins his analysis of rational agent 
with the following passage: “Everything in 
nature works according to laws. Only a 
rational being has the capacity to act 
according to the representation of laws, that 
is, according to a principle, or a will. Since 
reason is required for the derivation of 
actions from laws, the will is nothing other 
than practical reason.” [2] 
The above passage gives rise to 
different interpretations. The first question 
is about the nature of laws according to the 
representation of which rational agents act. 
According to Allison’s reading, the context 
within which Kant’s analysis is undertaken 
obliges us to take objective practical 
principles as the most genuine candidate of 
“laws” according to the representation of 
which rational agents act. 
[4] 
Timmermann 
[8] 
and Willaschek 
[10] 
also affirm this reading. 
By objective, Kant means that they are valid 
for all rational agents as such. 
[2] 
Since these 
principles are valid for all rational beings, 
they can be applied both to perfectly 
rational agents and imperfect rational 
beings. The only difference is that for holy 
rational beings they appear as descriptive 
laws, whereas they appear as prescriptive 
laws for imperfect rational beings. 
[4]
 
For Kant, to act according to one’s 
representation of laws means acting 
according to recognized norms which is 
taken by Kant as equivalent to “acting on 
principles”. [4] 
In the above passage, Kant also 
claims that if one is governed by this sense 
of law, he is said to have a will. He defines 
will “as the capacity to act according to the 
representation of laws”. In this case, he 
identifies will as practical reason. Allison 
maintains that Kant applies this 
identification to rational agents in general 
that includes both perfect and imperfect 
rational agents. However, Kant also holds 
that reason determines the will. 
[2] 
For 
Allison, when Kant claims that practical 
reason determines or fails to determine the 
will, he is talking about only in relation to 
imperfect rational agents. In order to make 
this point clear, Kant provides us with two 
ways in which reason determines the will. 
The first kind of will is the holly or 
perfectly rational will which is infallibly 
determined by reason. In this kind of will, 
there is no any competing force that dictates 
it to go out of the right track. We can find 
this kind of will in perfectly rational agents. 
[4] 
According to Kant, these beings 
necessarily act according to laws of reason. 
For them, actions which are recognized as 
objectively necessary are also subjectively 
necessary. But, in the second case, we can 
find a will such as human will in which 
reason fails to invariably determine it 
because it is subject to subjective 
inclinations. As a result, for this will, 
actions which are identified as objectively 
necessary are not subjectively necessary, 
rather they are subjectively contingent. 
Consequently, this kind of will is 
necessitated by the objective laws of reason. 
[2]
 
Since the human will and every 
other finite will are categorized under the 
second group, they are subject to 
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necessitation. This takes us to the idea of 
imperatives. According to Kant, 
[2] 
all 
imperatives are expressed by the word 
“ought”. “Ought” indicates the necessitation 
that holds between an objective principle 
and imperfectly rational beings.  
Perfectly rational beings necessarily 
act on objective principles which are 
imperative for imperfectly rational beings. 
They manifest the same kind of goodness 
manifested when imperfectly rational beings 
act based on imperatives. Thus, these 
objective principles are necessary but they 
are not imperatives for them. 
[2]
 
After discussing the nature of 
imperatives, Kant discusses the distinction 
between hypothetical and categorical 
imperatives. The distinction between them 
is made by the way they command. 
[4] 
To 
command hypothetically is to command 
under certain condition. By contrast, to 
command categorically is to command 
unconditionally independent of any 
calculated end. For Kant, it is only 
categorical imperative which is considered 
as imperatives of morality. 
[2] 
After discussing the different kinds 
of imperatives, Kant raises the question: 
“How are these imperatives possible?” [2] In 
this question, Kant wants to consider how to 
understand the necessitation imposed upon 
the will by imperatives and also how it is 
possible for finite rational beings to be 
motivated upon them as rational commands 
of their will. 
[4]
 
To understand the argument that 
Kant uses to answer the above question, we 
must understand the distinction between 
analytic and synthetic propositions. The 
predicate of any analytic proposition is 
contained in the subject concept of it and it 
can be derived by mere analysis of the 
subject concept. Thus, to justify any analytic 
proposition, it is not necessary to go beyond 
the subject concept. By contrast, in any 
synthetic proposition, the predicate is not 
contained in the subject concept and hence 
it is impossible to derive it by mere analysis 
of the subject concept. Thus, to justify a 
synthetic proposition it is a must to go 
beyond the subject concept and search for a 
third term that enables us to attribute the 
predicate to the subject concept. 
[7]
 
For Kant the possibility of 
hypothetical imperatives does not need any 
special explanation because all of them are 
analytic propositions. That means, they are 
grounded in “Whoever wills the end also 
wills (in so far as reason has decisive 
influence on his actions) the indispensably 
necessary means to it that are within his 
power”. [2] Kant seems to assume that, as 
Patonsuggests, the end is always a result, 
and for an end, it has one means which is 
considered as some possible action of the 
agent. If so, we can say that in the concept 
of willing an end, there is contained the 
concept of willing the action which is the 
means to the end. Thus, the proposition that 
“to will the end is to will the means is a 
theoretical analytic proposition”. [1] 
Now the issue is how this theoretical 
analytic proposition becomes practical 
analytic proposition and hypothetical 
imperatives. According to Paton, to fill this 
gap, we have to remember the above 
objective principle of practical reason. 
Although this proposition is still analytic, it 
appears imperative for us since reason does 
not have a decisive influence although it 
exists in us. Thus, it can be given the form 
“if any rational agent wills the end, he ought 
to will the means”. [1] 
  Kant notes that to know the means 
of the proposed end, we have to use 
synthetic propositions. We are required to 
know the cause of a certain desired effect 
and it is impossible to know what the cause 
of a certain effect through mere analysis of 
the effect itself. These synthetic 
propositions are theoretical. However, the 
imperative is still analytic as far as willing is 
concerned. 
[2]
 
The above kind of justification is not 
applicable to categorical imperative. 
Categorical imperative is unconditional and 
does not refer to an end that the agent seeks 
to attain. 
[2] 
To justify a categorical 
imperative, one has to show that “a fully 
rational agent would necessarily act in a 
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certain way, not if he happens to want 
something else, but simply and solely as a 
rational agent". 
[1] 
This proposition is not 
analytic because its predicate is not 
contained in the subject concept ‘rational 
agent’ and it cannot be derived by mere 
analysis of the subject concept. Thus, this 
proposition is synthetic. Moreover, it is an 
assertion of what any rational agent ought to 
do. As a result, it cannot be justified by 
appealing to experience. Hence, the 
categorical imperative is not only synthetic 
but also a priori. And it is very difficult to 
justify it. 
[1] 
Kant postpones this task to 
section III of the Groundwork.  
THE FORMULATION OF THE 
CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 
As noted earlier, Kant announces 
that he postpone the question of the 
possibility of categorical imperative to 
section III of the Groundwork. However, 
although the justification of this standard as 
the objective principle of rational agents 
cannot be derived from its very concept, it is 
possible to derive its content or what it 
enjoins from its concept. 
[8]
  
We said that categorical imperative 
is unconditional. The constraint imposed 
upon the will is independent of any end 
presupposed by the agent. Otherwise 
expressed, it just commands us to act (to 
adopt maxims) in conformity with objective 
principle. Laws are equally valid for all 
rational agents as such and they are 
universally and unconditionally valid 
constraints on action. Thus, the conformity 
of maxims to universal law as such follows 
from the mere concept of categorical 
imperative. 
[2] 
However, the maxim of finite 
rational beings can conform to universal 
laws only if such agents can also will them 
as universal laws. What is important is the 
compatibility between the material maxim 
and the thought of the same maxim as 
universal laws. From this idea, one can 
understand that a categorical imperative 
requires that an agent adopts only the 
maxim that he can at the same time wills as 
a universal law. This can be expressed in the 
formula: “Act only according to that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will 
that it becomes a universal law”. [2] 
According to Timmermann’s 
discussion, Kant holds that the above 
formulation is the one canonical and general 
formulation of the categorical imperative: 
there is only a single categorical imperative 
and it is the above principle (FUL). Other 
unconditional imperatives are either variants 
of this principle or individual ‘categorical 
imperatives’, i.e., particular applications of 
this principle. The formula of laws of 
nature, which immediately follows the 
present formulation, is the first of three 
variants. 
[8]
 
The above test, however, is abstract 
and Kant thinks that it may be difficult to 
apply it. He realizes that it is easier to apply 
the test to a maxim if we consider it not as a 
normative law but as a law of nature, a 
universal rule against which it is causally 
impossible for everyone to act. 
[9]
 
In the Groundwork, a few lines after 
stating FUL, Kant suggests that “Since the 
universality of law in accordance with 
which effects take place constitutes what is 
properly called nature in the most general 
sense (as regards its form) - that is, the 
existence of things in so far as it is 
determined in accordance with universal 
laws - the universal imperative of duty can 
also go as follows: act as if the maxim of 
your action were to become by your will a 
universal law of nature.” [2] 
According to Allison, Kant in the 
Critique of Pure Reason conceives of nature 
formally and materially. When nature is 
conceived formally, it is the existence of 
things according to universal laws.  Kant 
implicitly wants to claim that this concept of 
nature is used to show the conformity to 
universal law assumed in the categorical 
imperative. He makes the transition from 
FUL to formula of law of nature (FLN). 
According to Allison, this immediately 
gives rise to the question: “How can the idea 
of conformity to laws of nature represent the 
idea of conformity to laws of a completely 
different type, specifically, law of freedom? 
[4]
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Paton tried to address this question 
in the following way. In FUL, Kant informs 
us that the maxims on which we act ought to 
conform to universal law as such. He then 
continues to tell us that in nature, every 
event takes place according to universal 
law, particularly the law of cause and effect. 
From this, we can understand that nature 
and moral action have the same form 
although the law of freedom and the law of 
nature are not the same. This indicates that 
there is analogy between universal law of 
freedom and universal laws of nature. It is 
through this analogy that Kant assumes that 
the universal law imposed by the categorical 
imperative is represented by the law of 
nature and goes from FUL to FLN. 
[1]
 
In Critique of Practical Reason, Kant 
affirms that since FLN contains the key idea 
of universality, it is characterized as a 
“typic” of FUL. By this, he means a model 
or a symbolic representation by which we 
apply FUL to a particular maxim in moral 
deliberation. 
[11]
 
To use FLN, Kant tells us to imagine 
ourselves as a creator of a world to which 
we are a part. The most important point to 
be clarified here is, whether the proposed 
course of action is taken as a law of nature 
in which the agent is a member. The idea of 
being the law of nature expresses the idea of 
universality required by the categorical 
imperative. 
[4]
 
However, as Allison suggests, there 
is ambiguity with regard to the precise 
function assigned to the FLN by Kant. Some 
of Kant’s claims suggest that it is intended 
to function as a self-standing source of 
duties while suggests that the function of 
FLN is to rule out maxims that violate each 
of the four types of duties. 
[4]
 
Allison notes that Kant moves to the 
FH by enriching his previous idea of 
rational agency. As noted before, he holds 
that rational agents are beings with the 
capacity to act according to their 
representation of laws. He equalizes this 
capacity with the possession of a will or 
practical reason. 
[4] 
Kant re-expresses this 
idea in slightly different words by saying: 
“The will is thought as a capacity to 
determine itself to acting in conformity with 
the representation of certain laws. … . Now, 
what serves the will as the objective ground 
of its self-determination is an end… ”. The 
latter sentence brings about the second 
fundamental feature of all actions. That 
means, any rational action, in addition to 
having a principle, sets an end before itself. 
[2]
 
According to Kant, ends might be 
either subjective or objective. Subjective 
ends are based on desire or inclination. 
Since different agents have different 
inclinations, these ends are not based on 
reasons which are valid for all rational 
agents. They have a relative value and 
conditioned. So, these ends are only ground 
for hypothetical imperatives. 
[2]
 
But, objective ends are, unlike 
subjective ends, based on reasons that are 
valid for all rational agents. They have also 
unconditional and absolute value. This 
implies that these ends cannot result from 
mere human action since ends that result 
from mere human action do not have 
unconditional worth; instead they have to be 
an already existent end or ends in 
themselves. Thus, these ends could be the 
ground of categorical imperative. 
[2]
 
After having made clear the nature 
of ends that grounds the categorical 
imperative, Kant suggests that it is only 
rational beings or persons that can be ends 
in themselves. Since only persons have 
unconditional value, it is not right to use 
them merely as means to an end its value is 
only relative. If there is no such end, there 
would be no unconditioned good, 
categorical imperative for human beings. 
Thus, the peculiar end which is required for 
the categorical imperative to be possible is 
persons or rational beings. 
[2] 
To derive the 
FH, Kant uses the idea that rational agents 
are ends in themselves. Thus, the FH looks 
like this: “So act that you use humanity, 
whether in your own person or in the person 
of any other, always at the same time as an 
end, never merely as a means.” [2] The term 
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“humanity” refers to the rational capacities 
of human beings. 
[8]
 
The other formula is the formula of 
autonomy(FA). It is formulated based on the 
idea that a rational will makes itself the law 
that it obeys. 
[1] 
The formula is expressed as 
follows: “So act that your will can regard 
itself at the same time as making universal 
law through its maxim.” [2] This formula is 
the most important formulation of the 
supreme principle of morality because it 
leads to the idea of freedom. 
[1]
  
Kant tries to arrive at the FA in 
many ways that he does not clearly 
differentiate one another. Among others, 
one way that shows how Kant formulates 
the FA is that he derives it from the essence 
of categorical imperative. We said that the 
moral imperative is categorical and 
unconditional. Thus, it avoids any interest. 
The preceding formulas implicitly show 
this. Now, the FA explicitly avoids any 
interest. In suggesting that a moral will 
makes the law that it obeys, it is already 
suggesting that it is not determined by any 
interest since a will determined by interest is 
heteronymous. If will were determined by 
interest, it would be subject to the law that it 
does not make, and ultimately to natural 
law. For Kant, all philosophers that 
determine moral obligation by any kind of 
interest make the categorical imperative 
inconceivable and dismiss morality 
altogether. These philosophers advocate the 
doctrine of heteronomy rather than the 
doctrine of autonomy. Thus, this kind of 
theory does not give rise to categorical 
imperative, rather it gives rise to 
hypothetical. 
[2] From this we conclude, “If 
there is a categorical imperative, the moral 
will which obeys it must not be determined 
by interest, and therefore must itself make 
the universal laws which it is 
unconditionally bound to obey.” [1] 
Kant’s notion of autonomy further 
leads to another closely connected world, 
i.e., the realm of ends. He considers the 
realm of ends as an idea by which one can 
construct for himself the conception of 
autonomous agency. Otherwise expressed, 
when one considers himself as an 
autonomous agent, he is at the same time 
think of himself as a law-giving member of 
the realm of ends. To understand this idea 
more properly, it is essential to know what 
Kant means by “a realm of ends”. [4] Kant 
defines realm as “a systematic union of 
different rational beings under common 
laws”. [2] The term “systematic” indicates 
that the various members live harmoniously 
and also support one another. When we 
apply this conception to ends, the realm of 
ends is one in which the members are ends 
in themselves. 
[4]
 
Having discussed the realm of ends, 
let me proceed to spell out the formula of 
the realm of ends (FRE). This formula, 
along with the FA, is the most vital 
formulation of Kant’s categorical 
imperative. It can be expressed as: “Act in 
accordance with the maxims of a member 
giving universal laws for a merely possible 
realm of ends.” [2] Kant introduces this 
formula in combination with the FA and, in 
some passages, Kant even seems to consider 
FRE as expressions of FA. 
[2] 
Moreover, 
FRE can be derived by combining the ideas 
of previously mentioned formulas of 
categorical imperative. Thus, this enables 
the mentioned formula to be more adequate 
in expressing the spirit of the supreme 
principles of morality. 
[9]
 
THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE 
FORMULAS OF CATEGORICAL 
IMPERATIVE   
Kant says that: “The aforementioned three 
ways of representing the principle of 
morality are at bottom only so many 
formulas of the very same law, and one of 
them of itself unites the other two in it.” [2] 
Although this sentence is single, it contains 
two claims that require a separate treatment. 
The first claim is that these formulas are the 
expressions of the same law. As Allison 
suggests, the law represented by the three 
formulas (FLN, FH and FA/FRE) are the 
single categorical imperative that first stated 
and till now has been referred as FUL. We 
saw before that Kant characterized 
categorical imperative as single. Thus, the 
Abraham Tsehay Jemberie. A Critical Analysis of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals 
                    International Journal of Research & Review (www.gkpublication.in)  65 
Vol.4; Issue: 3; March 2017 
above sentence strengthens Kant’s claim 
that there is only one fundamental principle 
of morality. 
[4] 
Kant warns his readers not to 
take the various formulas as distinct ethical 
principles, rather they are the reformulations 
or variant formulations of the single 
categorical imperative. 
[8]
 
The second claim contained in the 
single sentence mentioned above is that one 
of the three reformulations unites the other 
two in itself. It is in this context that Kant 
talks about the mutual relation between the 
various formulas of the categorical 
imperative. In order to show which formula 
contains within itself the other two, and 
thereby to explain the mutual relation 
between them, Kant claims that every 
maxim has a form, a matter (end) and a 
complete determination. He suggests that 
every maxim has the form of generality in 
the sense that it is a general principle by 
which it is done. From this, Kant concludes 
that “in this respect the formula for moral 
imperative is expressed thus: that maxims 
must be chosen as if they were to hold as 
universal laws of nature”. By the law of 
nature, he equates it with FLN which 
specifies the formal condition that a maxim 
must fulfill that in turn enables to conform 
to the moral principle. In the same way, he 
argues that every maxim has a matter to 
which the action is done. 
[2] 
From this, he 
derives the FH in such a way that  “a 
rational being, as an end by its nature and 
hence as an end in itself, must in every 
maxim serve as the limiting condition of all 
merely relative and arbitrary ends”. [2] Thus, 
FH identifies the moral principle by 
objective end and this end is the existent end 
of humanity as an end in itself. This end 
serves as a motive for a will that follows a 
categorical imperative. However, “complete 
determination” does not apply to an 
individual maxim; rather it is a necessary 
condition of an entire system of moral 
legislation that governs the conduct of a 
rational agent. 
[9] 
The FA formulates the 
moral law in terms of this system. This 
becomes obvious when FA is expressed in 
the guise of FRE, because this formula 
explains that the law must unite all rational 
beings as ends in themselves into a 
harmonious organic system. In this way, 
FA/FRE not only goes beyond FLN and FH, 
considered individually, but also unites 
them. This also implies the interdependence 
and collective completeness of the three 
formulas. 
[2]
 
Kant indicates that there is a progression 
from one formula to another and the three 
formulas complement one another in their 
practical application. 
[2]
 
The three formulas refer to 
complementary ways when moral principle 
applied to maxims. FLN refers to the 
universal validity of each maxim; FH directs 
us to the many rational beings that must be 
treated as ends in themselves; and FA in the 
guise of FRE presents these ends as a 
harmonious commonwealth. 
[9]
 
There is a progression from FLN to 
FH and then to FA/FRE. The FLN, as the 
legislative form of a maxim, leads to the 
search for the objective end which 
represents this legislative form. This end is 
found in rational beings as ends in 
themselves. Thus, FLN progresses to FH. 
The combination of FLN and FH provides 
FA/FRE in the sense that the worth of 
rational nature which grounds FH and 
conceived as the idea of a rational will is 
considered as the author of laws 
presupposed in FLN. 
[9]
 
Finally, as Timmermann reminds us, 
Kant recommends the strict method of FUL 
in practical purpose or for moral appraisal, 
but the three formulas (FLN, FH and 
FA/FRE) come to secure acceptance for the 
moral law or to bring the FUL to intuition 
through analogy. 
[8]
 
As we have seen so far, in the first 
two sections of the Groundwork, Kant 
describes the procedure he used as analytic. 
[4] 
In section one of the Groundwork, Kant 
starts from analysis of ordinary moral 
beliefs and arrived at a version of the 
categorical imperative. He then argued that 
the condition for moral action, at least for 
finite rational beings, is obedience to a 
categorical imperative. In section two of the 
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Groundwork, he formulates the categorical 
imperative in at least three ways and he 
completed the first of the two tasks that he 
wanted to accomplish in the Groundwork, 
i.e., to search for and formulate the supreme 
principle of morality as it is found in 
common human reason. 
[1]
 
Section three of the Groundwork is 
devoted to the second task that Kant wanted 
to accomplish; that is, to establish the 
objective validity of the supreme principle 
of morality through deduction. This requires 
to demonstrate its unconditional bindingness 
for all finite rational beings. 
[4] 
So, let me 
discuss section three of the Groundwork in 
detail. 
THE JUSTIFICATION OF THE 
CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE 
THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM AND 
AUTONOMY OF THE WILL 
We have a clear concept of 
autonomy, a defining property of moral will, 
in the last section of the Groundwork. 
Section three of the Groundwork is 
concerned with justification that human 
beings have a will that has this property. 
Kant claims that the concept of freedom 
provides the key for this endeavor. 
[2] 
This is 
because freedom is a necessary condition 
for its possibility. Freedom is not merely a 
necessary but also a sufficient condition for 
autonomy and thus of morality. 
[8]
 
Let me go to the detail of Kant’s 
argument. Kant begins section three of the 
Groundwork with a new definition of a will. 
Initially, he defined will as “the power of a 
rational being to act in accordance with its 
conception of laws, i.e., in accordance with 
principles”. [2] But, he now considers it as “a 
kind of causality of living beings in so far as 
they are rational”. [2] Will is considered as a 
kind of causality, because it is the power of 
a rational being to produce effects in the 
world experience. However, “If we 
conceive the will to be free, we must mean 
in the first place that the will is a power to 
produce effects without being determined or 
caused to do so by anything other than 
itself.” [1] Freedom is a quality attributed to a 
special kind of causality. As such, it is 
opposed to natural necessity, a causality 
attributed to non-rational beings. 
[2] 
Non-
rational beings can act causally only so long 
as they are caused to do so by something 
else other than themselves. 
[1]
 
“If the will of a rational agent is conceived 
as free, this must mean that we regard his 
causal actions, or more precisely his 
volitions, as not determined by causes 
external or alien to himself.” [1] 
Kant holds that since his initial 
characterization freedom as a complete 
independence of natural determination is 
merely negative, it is not informative into its 
nature. However, if this negative concept of 
freedom is rejected, it would be impossible 
to justify the positive concept of freedom. In 
fact, the positive concept of freedom 
follows from the negative one. 
[2]
 
To show freedom is equivalent to 
autonomy, Kant needs to move from the 
negative concept of freedom to the positive 
one. Having defined will as a kind of free 
causality, he attempts to do this by the 
concept of causality. Kant asserts that the 
concept of causality implies the concept of 
laws in accordance with which through 
something which we call 'cause' something 
else namely, the effect must be posited. 
Thus, a causality characterized not by 
natural necessity but by freedom cannot be 
lawless, but must accord with unchanging 
laws of a special kind. Otherwise a free will 
would be a logical absurdity. 
[2] 
However, as 
Paton shows, the ground for this assertion is 
inadequate. Because, the law to which Kant 
talks about appears to be a law that connects 
causes and effects. Thus, we can apply this 
only to natural necessity. It is difficult to 
pass from this to a law of freedom. Because 
the law of freedom is a law of causal action 
considered in it self. 
[1]
 
According to Paton there is a more 
strong force in the assertion that a lawless 
free will is an absurdity. However, this view 
is not derived from any necessary 
connection between causality and law. It 
rather comes into being from the fact that a 
lawless free will would be governed by 
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chance so that it cannot be regarded as free. 
[1]
 
As Paton says, if Kant’s doctrine is 
based on the argument that presupposes the 
necessary connection between laws and 
causality, it is fallacious. Paton holds that 
the argument is “as superfluous as it is 
weak”. It is because there is no need to 
make a connection between free will and 
law on the basis of the concept of causality. 
[1] 
Kant holds that the very definition of will, 
as given before, is “the power of a rational 
being to act in accordance with its 
conception of laws, i.e. in accordance with 
principles”. If so, a lawless free will is a 
self-contradiction; it cannot be a will at all.  
As Paton discussed, Kant at this 
stage, is not attempting to justify that a will 
is free. But, he is just showing how a free 
will, if there is such a thing, would be 
conceived. 
[1] 
It is obvious that a will 
governed by laws of natural necessity is not 
free. Because, in nature, the law governing 
causal action is not self-imposed but 
imposed by something else. This is what is 
called heteronomy. Thus, if a free will is not 
lawless, its laws must be special kinds of 
laws which differ from laws of natural 
necessity. The only way to distinguish laws 
of freedom from laws of nature is to 
suppose that laws of freedom are self-
imposed. Thus, the causal action of free will 
is conducted by self-imposed law. But, this 
is what does mean by autonomy. A free will 
must be autonomous will.  Moral law is the 
law of autonomous will. Thus, a free will 
must be conceived as acting under the moral 
law. Kant concludes that a free will and a 
will under moral law are one and the same 
thing. Thus, Kant holds that if we could 
presuppose the concept of freedom, the 
concept of autonomy and thus morality 
follows, through mere analysis, from the 
concept of freedom. 
[2]
 
FREEDOM AS A NECESSARY 
PRESUPPOSITION 
According to Kant, if freedom could 
be established in the way described before, 
the concept of autonomy and thereby the 
supreme principle of morality would follow 
by a mere analysis of the concept of 
freedom. However, to justify the moral 
principle, only describing the characteristics 
of freedom which must be present in a will 
if it is to be considered as free is not 
enough. Rather, we have to show that every 
rational being with a will is, and indeed 
must be, free in the way explained before. 
This is because “in as much as morality 
serves as a law for us only in so far as we 
are rational beings, it must also be valid for 
all rational beings. And since morality must 
be derived solely from the property of 
freedom, one must also show that freedom 
is the property of the will of all rational 
beings”. [2] 
It is useless to appeal to the 
experience of human action to show that the 
will of every rational being is necessarily 
free. This is because experience of freedom, 
if it were possible (indeed impossible), 
gives only a fact rather than a necessary 
connection between the will of every 
rational beings and freedom. 
[2]
 
As Paton discussed it, Kant argues 
that we can show that a rational agent as 
such can act on the presupposition that he is 
free (Under the Idea of freedom). That 
means, so long as we are rational beings, we 
necessarily act under the idea of freedom. 
The justification of this necessary 
presupposition would be enough to justify 
the moral law. If a rational agent must act 
on the presupposition that he is free, he 
must act on the presupposition that he is 
under moral law. 
[1]
 
To justify the presupposition of 
freedom, Kantbegins with theoretical reason 
than just practical reason. He claims that 
“We cannot possibly conceive of a reason as 
being consciously directed from outside in 
regard to its judgements.” If a rational being 
were conscious of any such external 
influence, he would consider his judgement 
as determined, not by reason, but rather by 
impulse. Reason must, if it is to be reason at 
all, consider itself as the author of its own 
principles and capable of functioning in 
accordance with these principles 
independently of external influences. 
[2]
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Kant holds that the above argument 
which is valid for theoretical reason must 
equally be valid for practical reason (i.e., as 
a rational will or as reason exercising 
causality). 
[2] 
That means, a rational agent as 
such must, in action, presuppose his rational 
will to be the source of its own principles of 
action and to be capable of functioning in 
accordance with these principles. To say 
this is tantamount to that a rational being 
must act only on the presupposition that he 
is free. Only then can a rational being 
consider his will as his own. This is the 
doctrine that Kant wants to establish and 
from which the principle of morality follows 
analytically. Paton argues that, for Kant, 
freedom is a necessary presupposition for 
both all actions and thinking. This means 
that a rational being can act, just as he can 
think, merely on the presupposition of 
freedom. A rational being implicitly 
presupposes freedom both in his action and 
thinking. If not, there is no anything as 
action and there is no such thing as will. 
[1]
 
THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 
Kant’s argument seems complete. 
But, he worries that his argument for human 
autonomy might contain a vicious circle. 
Morality was ‘traced back’ to the idea of 
freedom at the first subsection of section 
three of the Groundwork, and in the next 
subsection it was argued that freedom needs 
to be necessarily presupposed if we are to 
think of ourselves, as rational agents, bound 
by moral laws. Thus, we have not yet been 
presented with an independent ground of the 
idea of freedom. As a way out of the vicious 
circle, Kant introduces us to the doctrine of 
the two standpoints. 
[2]
 
THE TWO STANDPOINTS 
According to Kant, all the ideas 
which are provided to our senses come to us 
without our own volition. We assume that 
these ideas come to us from objects. By 
means of these ideas, we can know objects 
only as they affect us. However, we do not 
know what these objects are in themselves. 
This leads to the division between things as 
they appear to us (appearance) and things as 
they are in themselves (things in 
themselves). We know only appearances. 
However, we have to assume that behind 
appearances, there are things in themselves 
even if we do not know these things in 
themselves, but as they affect us. This gives 
rise to a rough distinction between a 
sensible world and an intelligible world. 
The world of sense is given through sense 
and varies in accordance with the difference 
of sensibility in various observers. On the 
other hand, the intelligible world can be 
conceived but never known since 
knowledge requires sensing and conceiving 
and it remains always the same. 
[2]
 
Kantalso argues that this distinction applies 
to man’s knowledge of himself. Man can 
know himself only as he appears by means 
of inner sense or through introspection. 
However, behind this appearance, he must 
assume, there is an Ego as it is in itself. In 
so far as he is known through introspection, 
and in so far as he is capable of receiving 
sensations passively, he must consider 
himself as members of the sensible world. 
On the other hand, in so far as he is capable 
of pure activities without the influence of 
sense, he must consider himself as members 
of the intelligible world. But, Kant suggests 
that we know nothing about this world. 
[2]
 
Kant claims that man really finds in 
himself a pure activity which is free from 
the influence of sense (a faculty of reason) 
affected by objects. 
[2] 
Here, as Paton noted, 
Kant appeals to theoretical reason, as he did 
before. But, he now uses it in his own 
critical sense. 
[7] 
According to Kant, we have 
a spontaneous faculty of understanding. The 
power of understanding along with other 
factors produces from itself concepts or 
categories and it uses these categories to 
bring the ideas of sense under rules. 
Therefore, although the faculty of 
understanding is genuinely spontaneous, it 
is still bound up with sense. Without the use 
of sensibility, it does not do anything at all. 
On the other hand, reason is a power of 
ideas. That means, it produces 
unconditioned concepts that goes far beyond 
what sensibility can offers. Reason, unlike 
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understanding, can show a pure spontaneity 
which is totally independent of sense. 
[2]
 
In virtue of this spontaneity, Kant 
argues that man must conceive himself, 
quaintelligence, as members of the 
intelligible world and regards himself as 
subject to laws that are grounded merely in 
reason. On the other hand, as long as man is 
sensuous and known to himself through 
inner sense, he must regard himself as 
belong to the world of sense and regard 
himself as subject to laws that have their 
grounds in nature alone. According to Kant, 
these are the two equally legitimate 
standpoints from which man (a finite 
rational being) must regard himself. 
[2]
 
For Kant, the above doctrine of 
theoretical reason is equally applicable to 
pure practical reason. That means, since 
man, as a finite rational being, from one 
standpoint, can regard himself as belonging 
to the intelligible world, he can regard his 
will as free from the determination of 
sensuous causes and as obedient to laws 
grounded merely in reason. 
[2] 
This is 
tantamount to saying “As a rational being, 
and thus as a being belonging to the 
intelligible world, human being can never 
think of the causality of his own will 
otherwise than under the idea of freedom; 
for, independence from the determining 
causes of the world of sense (which reason 
must always ascribe to itself) is freedom”. [2] 
From this, there follows the principle of 
morality (the moral law) and the categorical 
imperative. 
[2] 
As we understand from the 
above argument, Kant’s argument proceeds 
from being member of the intelligible world 
to the idea of freedom.  
The suspicion of the vicious circle, 
according to Kant, is now avoided. Because 
“we now see that when we think of 
ourselves as free we transfer ourselves into 
the intelligible world as members and 
cognize autonomy of the will along with its 
consequence, morality”. [2] But, when man 
regards himself as members of both the 
intelligible and the sensible world, he can 
recognize the moral law as a categorical 
imperative. 
[2] 
Kant, here, argues from 
freedom to the intelligible world, which is 
directly opposed to the previous argument.   
As we have seen so far, in the 
Groundwork, Kant does not clearly show 
whether he infers from the concept of 
freedom to the intelligible world or from 
being member of the intelligible world to 
the concept of freedom, or whether he is 
establishing a reciprocal connection 
between being members of the intelligible 
world and the concept of freedom. For sure, 
if Kant uses the last option, he does not 
reject the vicious circle.  
HOW IS A CATEGORICAL 
IMPERATIVE POSSIBLE? 
To answer this question, Kant begins 
again by maintaining that a rational being 
must regard himself as belonging to the 
intelligible world. From this, Kant infers 
that a rational being considers himself as 
exercising causality and manifesting a free 
will. According to Kant, man, as a finite 
rational being, must also regard himself 
from the standpoint of the sensible world. In 
connection to this, Kant argues that if I were 
solely a member of the intelligible world, all 
my actions would necessarily conform to 
the principle of autonomy; if I were solely a 
member of the world of sense, they would 
necessarily be exclusively subject to the law 
of nature. 
[2] 
At this point, as Paton properly 
mentions it, Kant inserts a strange argument 
and at the same time confused in expression 
and difficult to interpret: 
[7]
 “The intelligible 
world contains the ground of the sensible 
world and therefore also the ground of its 
laws; consequently, the intelligible world is 
(and must be thought of as) directly 
legislative for my will (which belongs 
wholly to the intelligible world).” [2] From 
this premise which is itself problematic in 
the sense that it needs a considerable 
expansion, Kant infers that the law 
governing my will as a member of the 
intelligible world (from one standpoint) 
ought to govern my will although I am also, 
from another standpoint, a member of the 
world of sense; 
[2]
 “I must regard the laws of 
the intelligible world as imperative for me 
and the laws conforming to this principle as 
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duties.” [2] As we understand from his word, 
Kant here introduces a metaphysical 
argument from the superior reality of the 
intelligible world and the rational will. 
Kant concludes his argument by 
saying that “categorical imperatives are 
possible because the idea of freedom makes 
me a member of an intelligible world. Now 
if I were a member of only that world, all 
my actions would always accord with 
autonomy of the will.” [2] But, because I am 
also a member of the world of sense, I 
experience the moral law as an imperative 
or my actions ought to accord to it. This 
categorical “ought”, Kant tells us, presents a 
synthetic a priori proposition. Thus, to 
connect this ought with my finite will and 
by extension the will of any other rational 
being like me, a third term is needed. In 
other words, to establish the thesis that the 
will of every finite rational being ought 
always to act in accordance with the moral 
law, it is needed to combine the following 
two separate concepts: (i) the human will 
which is affected by sensuous desires and 
inclinations and (ii) the principle morality. 
The third term that connects these two 
different concepts is the same will but 
viewed as a pure will belonging to the 
intelligible world. Consequently, the laws of 
the intelligible world (i.e., autonomy) must 
be the condition of actions of human will 
which is affected by sensuous desires. 
[2]
 
However, the deduction that Kant, in 
section three of the Groundwork, assumes to 
be successful is problematic. To show the 
deduction or the justification of a 
categorical imperative is unsuccessful, it is 
crucial to consider at least three problems 
mentioned by Timmermann. I shall return to 
this issue later. 
 
CONCLUSION IN CRITIQUE FORM  
In the Groundwork, the aim of Kant 
is to search for and establish the supreme 
principle of morality. Categorical 
imperative is the supreme principle of 
morality in its imperative mood. However, 
Kant does not insist that he discovered the 
categorical imperative. This is because the 
supreme principle of morality has implicitly 
been used by any rational agents in order to 
make their choice and judgment. Thus, he 
aimed at exposing the moral principle which 
has been implicitly used by the pre-
philosophical understanding of morality. 
Although in the pre-philosophical 
understanding of morality, any ordinary 
good men used this principle to judge moral 
actions, they were unable to make this 
principle clear for themselves.    
Accordingly, in section one of the 
Groundwork, Kant begins with ordinary 
ways of thinking about morality and moves 
into exposing the principle that ordinary 
good man is supposed to implicitly use in 
judging his action. Kant’s intention is to 
derive it through the analysis of the concept 
of a good will. This is because any person 
who does the right thing for the right reason 
evinces a good will. Thus, through analysis 
of the concept of a good will, Kant reaches a 
version of the categorical imperative as the 
principle in which a good will under human 
condition would act. 
Kant holds that his analysis fully 
agrees with ordinary human reason. 
Although the ordinary good man does not 
establish this moral principle in abstraction, 
he really uses it in evaluating particular 
moral matters. Even in practical matters, 
ordinary human reason is more important 
than philosophy.  
But, common moral cognition is pre-
philosophical in its origin and it is a species 
of innocence in its unreflective form. Thus, 
it is incapable of protecting itself against 
evil. It will be easily seduced. Therefore, it 
is subject not only to philosophical 
explication, but also to rigorous 
philosophical criticism, correction, and 
rejection.    
In section two of the Groundwork, 
Kant continues to expose the supreme 
principle of morality but now through 
different way. He explores it from a 
philosophical stand point. Kant continues to 
expose the supreme principle of morality in 
section two of the Groundwork, in order to 
show that this principle has the 
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characteristics of absolute necessity. This 
cannot be shown by claiming that it is 
implicitly found in common human reason. 
Because this may imply that this principle is 
grounded in human nature which in turn 
prevents it from possessing the 
characteristics of absolute necessity.   
In section two of Groundwork, Kant 
begins his new argument with some analysis 
of rational beings. All things in nature act in 
accordance with laws, but only rational 
beings act according to the conception of a 
law. The laws according to its 
representation finite rational beings act 
bring the concept of imperatives that 
constrain the will.  
Kant suggests all imperatives 
command either hypothetically or 
categorically. To command hypothetically is 
to command something under certain 
condition. By contrast, to command 
categorically is to command 
unconditionally.   
For Kant, since the moral law, if it 
exists, must apply universally and 
necessarily, it cannot be based on 
hypothetical imperatives. The imperative 
related to the moral law must be a 
categorical. Since the categorical imperative 
applies to all rational beings regardless of 
the various ends a person would have, it 
could be the basis of the moral law. As we 
know, a categorical imperative could not be 
based on a particular end.  Thus, Kant holds 
that the categorical imperative must be 
based on the notion of a law itself. Laws by 
definition, apply universally.  From this, 
Kant derives the content of the categorical 
imperative that requires moral agents act 
only in a way that the maxim of their action 
can be a universal law. And he calls it 
formula of universal law (FUL). The 
categorical imperative is Kant’s general 
expression of the supreme principle of 
morality in its imperative mood, but Kant 
continues to provide three different 
formulas of this general formulation. These 
additional formulas refer to different stages 
that in turn enable him to fully construct the 
concept of the categorical imperative.  
The first formula of the categorical 
imperative is the formula of law of nature 
(FLN). This formulation states that an 
action is only morally permissible if every 
moral agent can adopt the same maxim of 
action in a world in which he is a member 
without contradiction.   
The second formulation of the 
categorical imperative is the Formula of 
Humanity (FH). Kant reaches this formula 
by considering the motivating ground of the 
categorical imperative. Since the moral law 
is necessary and universal, its motivating 
ground must have absolute worth. If we find 
something with an end in itself, it would be 
the only possible ground of a categorical 
imperative. Kant asserts that every rational 
being exists as an end in itself.   
The third formulation of the 
categorical imperative is the formula of 
autonomy. This formula is formulated on 
the basis of the idea that a rational will 
makes itself the law that it obeys. It takes 
important elements from both the mentioned 
two formulas. The first Formula (FLN) 
specifies the universality of laws, while the 
second formula (FH) is more subjective and 
focuses on how you treat the person with 
whom you are interacting. Thus, by 
combining the objective and subjective 
aspect of the two formulas, Kant leads to the 
idea that every rational being is involved in 
making universal laws. 
Kant suggests that the notion of 
autonomy further leads to another closely 
connected world, namely the realm of ends. 
When one considers himself as an 
autonomous agent, he at the same time 
thinks of himself as a law-giving member of 
the realm of ends.  
In relation to the realm of ends, Kant 
formulates the formula of autonomy in the 
shape of formula of realm of ends (FRE): 
act in such a way that your maxim could be 
a law in the realm of ends. 
[5] 
Since FRE can 
be derived by combining the ideas of 
previously mentioned formulas of the 
categorical imperative, it could be more 
adequate in expressing the spirit of the 
supreme principles of morality. 
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Kant asserts that FLN, FH and 
FA/FRE are not independent ethical 
theories. They are rather reformulations or 
variants of the single categorical imperative. 
The single categorical imperative 
represented by these formulas is the FUL. 
Thus, in saying this, Kant accomplishes the 
first of the second task that he aims to fulfill 
in the Groundwork, namely formulating the 
supreme principle of morality. 
In section three of the Groundwork, 
Kant attempts to accomplish the second 
project that he aims to fulfill in the 
Groundwork, namelyto establish the 
objective validity of the supreme principle 
of morality through transcendental 
deduction.In the last two sections of the 
Groundwork, Kant claims that he is not 
maintaining the truth of morality. What he 
has done is that he has determined the 
condition of accepted moral beliefs through 
analytic argument. If so, it is impossible to 
justify ordinary moral beliefs progressively 
from this ultimate precondition without a 
vicious circle. Thus, Kant has to establish 
these ultimate preconditions independently 
through transcendental deduction. That is, it 
is required a transcendental deduction of the 
supreme principle of morality. Its function 
is to establish the possibility that moral 
judgements are valid. At present, Kant 
insists that it is an open question whether 
morality and its condition on which it is 
founded are not merely phantom of the 
brain.  
To show that this worry is 
groundless, in section three of the 
Groundwork, Kant begins with a new 
definition of a will. He considers will as a 
causality of rational beings. Will is 
considered as a kind of causality, because it 
is the power of a rational being to produce 
effects in the world experience. But, if the 
will were determined by laws of nature, it 
would not be free. Thus, a free will must be 
conceived as one free from any external 
influence.  
This is only negative concept of 
freedom. But, this negative concept of 
freedom is important to know the positive 
one. The positive concept of freedom is 
autonomy. He leads to the positive concept 
of freedom through the concept of causality. 
Kant asserts that a causality characterized 
by natural necessity is governed by laws. 
Thus, a causality characterized not by 
natural necessity but by freedom cannot be 
lawless because a lawless free will would be 
a logical absurdity. Thus, a free will must 
act under laws. However, the way he asserts 
this is inadequate. Because the law to which 
Kant talks about is a law that connects 
causes and effects. Since we can apply this 
only to natural necessity, it is difficult to 
pass from this to a law of freedom. Because 
the law of freedom is a law of causal action 
considered in itself.  From this problematic 
premise, he argues that the laws of free will 
could not be one imposed upon it by others. 
If it is not other imposed, it must be self-
imposed.  But, this is what does mean by 
autonomy. Thus, a free will is equivalent to 
autonomous will. Since moral law is the law 
of autonomous will, a free will must be 
conceived as acting under the moral law. 
Kant concludes that a free will and a will 
under moral law are one and the same thing. 
Thus, Kant holds that if we could 
presuppose the concept of freedom, the 
concept of autonomy and thus morality 
follows, through mere analysis, from the 
concept of freedom. 
However, if Kant’s doctrine is based on the 
argument that presupposes the necessary 
connection between law and causality, it has 
to be rejected as fallacious. As a result, Kant 
fails to connect autonomous will and free 
will which is one of two connections he 
wants to fulfill in the Groundwork. 
According to Kant, since morality is 
valid for all rational beings, justification of 
morality depends on the connection between 
freedom and the will of every rational being. 
Although it is impossible to show this 
through experience, it is possible to show 
that a rational agent as such can act on the 
presupposition that he is free. That means, 
so long as we are rational beings, we 
necessarily act under the idea of freedom. 
The justification of this necessary 
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presupposition would be enough to justify 
the moral law.  
Kant’s argument seems complete. 
But, he worries that his argument presented 
so far might contain a vicious circle.  As a 
way out this vicious circle, Kant introduces 
the doctrine of the two standpoints. In the 
Critique of Pure Reason, he suggests that all 
ideas which are provided to our senses come 
to us from objects. Through these ideas, we 
know objects only as they affect us, but not 
in themselves. This leads to the division 
between appearance and things in 
themselves. This in turn leads to the 
distinction between a sensible world and an 
intelligible world. The world of sense is 
given through sense. But, the intelligible 
world can be conceived but never known. 
Kant applies this distinction to 
man’s knowledge of himself. Man can know 
himself only as he appears through 
introspection. But, behind this appearance, 
he must assume, there is an Ego as it is in 
itself. In so far as he is known through 
introspection, he must consider himself as 
members of the sensible world. On the other 
hand, so far as he is capable of pure 
activities without the influence of sense, he 
must consider himself as members of the 
intelligible world. 
Kant claims that man really finds in 
himself a faculty of reason which is pure 
activity and free from the influence of sense. 
Kant here is talking about theoretical reason 
and applies this to practical reason. Thus, 
through the faculty of reason, man must 
conceive himself as members of the 
intelligible world and regards himself as 
subject to laws that are grounded merely in 
reason. On the other hand, so far as man is 
sensuous and known to himself through 
inner sense, he must regard himself as 
members of the sensible world and as 
subject to laws grounded merely in nature. 
These are the two equally legitimate 
standpoints from which man must regard 
himself. The doctrine of theoretical reason 
is equally applicable to pure practical 
reason. Thus, since a finite rational being, 
from one standpoint, can regard himself as 
members of the intelligible world, he can 
regard his will as free from any sensuous 
determination and as obedient to laws 
grounded merely in reason. From this, there 
follows the principle of morality and the 
categorical imperative. Here, Kant argues 
from membership of the intelligible world to 
the idea of freedom although he rejects it in 
the next argument. 
To show that the suspicion of the vicious 
circle is avoided, Kant argues from freedom 
to the intelligible world, which is directly 
opposed to the previous argument and that 
shows his inconsistency and hesitation in 
the Groundwork. He says, more specifically, 
that “when we think of ourselves as free we 
transfer ourselves into the intelligible world 
as members and cognize autonomy of the 
will along with its consequence, morality”. 
[2] 
But, when man regards himself as 
members of both the intelligible and the 
sensible world, he can recognize the moral 
law as a categorical imperative. 
Thus, as it has been shown above, in 
the Groundwork, Kant does not clearly 
show whether he infers from the concept of 
freedom to the membership of the 
intelligible world or from being member of 
the intelligible world to the concept of 
freedom, or whether he is establishing a 
reciprocal connection between being 
members of the intelligible world and the 
concept of freedom. For sure, if Kant uses 
the last option, he does not reject the vicious 
circle. Kant also repeats this inconsistency 
or hesitation when he attempts to answer the 
question “how is a categorical imperative 
possible?” as it is shown below.  
To answer the question “how is a 
categorical imperative possible?”, he begins 
by maintaining that “a rational being must 
regard himself as belonging to the 
intelligible world, only then a rational being 
considers himself as exercising causality 
and manifesting a free will”. [2] A finite 
rational being must also regard himself from 
the standpoint of the sensible world. At this 
point, Kant inserts a strange argument and at 
the same time confused in expression and 
difficult to interpret: “The intelligible world 
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contains the ground of the sensible world 
and therefore also the ground of its laws; 
consequently, the intelligible world is (and 
must be thought of as) directly legislative 
for my will (which belongs wholly to the 
intelligible world).” [2] From this 
problematic premise, he infers that the law 
governing my will as a member of the 
intelligible world ought to govern my will 
although I am also, from another standpoint, 
a member of the world of sense. In this 
problematic argument, Kant seems to 
introduce a metaphysical argument from the 
superior reality of the intelligible world and 
the rational will. If he really uses a 
metaphysical doctrines to establish the 
principle of morality, indeed he does, Kant 
commits a fundamental error since it is 
impossible to deduce moral obligation from 
metaphysical considerations which has 
nothing to do with morality. In fact, Kant 
himself seems to be aware of his mistake. 
The reason is that, at the preface of the 
Groundwork, Kant holds that he has a plan 
to publish a book entitled Metaphysics of 
Morals. The Groundwork serves merely as a 
preliminary to Metaphysics of Morals. But, 
he first publishes Critique of Practical 
Reason rather than Metaphysics of Morals, 
and some of arguments in the Critique of 
Practical Reason are different from the 
Groundwork. This implies that Kant himself 
seems to be aware of that in the 
Groundwork he has no sufficient reason to 
establish the categorical imperative. 
As we have seen above, to answer 
the question “how is a categorical 
imperative possible?” he argues from 
membership of the intelligible world to 
freedom. But, when he concludes his 
argument in asserting the possibility of the 
categorical imperative, he argues from 
freedom to membership of the intelligible 
world in such a way that “categorical 
imperatives are possible because the idea of 
freedom makes me a member of an 
intelligible world. Now if I were a member 
of only that world, all my actions would 
always accord with autonomy of the will.” 
[2] 
But, because I am also a member of the 
world of sense, I experience the moral law 
as an imperative or my actions ought to 
accord to it. This categorical “ought” 
presents a synthetic a priori proposition. 
Thus, to connect this ought with every finite 
will, or to establish the thesis that the will of 
every finite rational being ought always to 
act in accordance with the principle of 
morality, it is needed to combine the 
following two separate concepts: the 
humanwill or finite will and the principle 
morality. The third term that connects these 
two different concepts is the same will but 
viewed as a pure will belonging to the 
intelligible world. Consequently, the laws of 
the intelligible world must be the condition 
of actions of human will which is affected 
by sensuous desires.  
In addition to problems mentioned 
before, there is another fundamental error 
that shows the deduction that Kant, in 
section three of the Groundwork, assumes to 
be successful is failed.  
That means, as I mentioned before, 
Kant, in the Groundwork, attempts to justify 
the bindingness of the categorical 
imperative for finite will through deduction 
more specifically through transcendental 
deduction. He ends this project in the way 
presented so far. But, it is unsuccessful. To 
show this, it is important to state at least 
three problems mentioned by Jens 
Timmermann. 
[8] 
First, Kant claims that the 
two concepts which are supposed to be 
connected in a synthetic judgement must be 
connected by a third element that contains 
both of them. But, in the above case, the 
idea of a pure will located in the intelligible 
world may contain the laws of autonomy 
(the moral law), but it is not obvious that it 
contains the idea of itself as a finite will or a 
human will. Secondly, Kant, in the Critique 
of Pure Reason, thinks that the minimum 
condition for the objective validity of 
synthetic judgment is time. That means, a 
synthetic judgement cannot be objectively 
valid if the ‘third something’ is not provided 
in intuition of time. In light of this, the 
deduction or the justification of the 
categorical imperative in the Groundwork is 
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unsuccessful, since a pure will is not 
provided in intuition of time. Thirdly, some 
interest in moral behavior is needed to 
conduct the connection in practice: 
reverence for the moral law. But, the 
possibility of explaining this interest lies 
beyond the boundaries of practical 
philosophy as Kant himself admits.  
In general, arguments that Kant uses, 
in the Groundwork, to justify the binding 
character of the categorical imperative for 
finite rational beings are problematic, 
obscure and inconsistent. As we have seen 
so far, some of the arguments in the Ground 
work contradict with each other and others 
contradict with arguments in the Critique of 
Pure Reason. Thus, the existence of these 
problems implies that Kant, in the 
Groundwork, does not have a sufficient 
reason to establish the categorical 
imperative. In other words, Kant, in the 
Groundwork, does not put the categorical 
imperative or morality on a solid ground. 
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